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1. This para US reply worded as it is in order to reflect distinction between special legal tripartite responsibility Berlin and Germany which implies unanimous agreement, as contrasted with more general responsibility NATO for this question.

2. This seems merely drafting suggestion.

4. Subject [] (POLIO 56) there is quadripartite agreement to **B1**
alteration para 4 as outlined DEPTTEL 232 to Paris. No further changes contemplated.
Whatever merit there is in [] suggestion, NAC plainly at odds on best language **B**
this para. As for [] suggestion, it is delicate question how expressive **B1**
of willingness to negotiate the reply should be. [] would introduce **B1**
new element this regard in tone of note, ~~and would indicate discussion with~~

~~Such a change would be a serious~~

8. [] point is one which has been made many times before in **B1**
Western declarations. From tactical viewpoint would appear to us stress this
point might blunt intended thrust of note.

14. The Soviet insistence that our rights will terminate necessarily im-
plies use of force by them to foreclose our exercise of our present rights.

32. Word QUOTE abnormal UNQUOTE has come to have a special significance
in discussions Germany and Berlin. For this reason quotation marks should remain.

[] point is good one which fully developed by Western Allies in **B1**
reply of December 31, 1958. See comment point 8 above.

Since drafting above, re 4, note from [] have **B1**
withdrawn agreement.

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